This is a follow-up to my earlier post entitled “Your Privacy and What’s On Your Hard Drive.” An alternative title to this post could be “The World May Be Flat but That Only Makes It Easier for the Government to Find You on the Grid.”
I must concede I was an avid viewer of “24,” particularly the second season. It was “appointment television,” a must watch every week to see if Jack Bauer and his CTU colleagues could prevent the next imminent terrorist attack on our soil. Jack and the CTU could not have succeeded in their efforts if they didn’t have the ability to position satellites to track people’s movements on the streets of Los Angeles or to instantly intercept their telephone calls. Of course, in reality, that series was fictional and no government agency known as CTU or the Counter Terrorist Unit exists.
However, the National Security Agency does exist and on February 26th the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that the Plaintiff journalists, lawyers and human rights advocates who challenged a 2008 amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act lacked standing to sue, in other words, demonstrate that they would be harmed by that Amendment, for the reason that their fear that they would be subject to surveillance under the Act was too speculative. Because the Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of that amendment before the Supreme Court on the ground that they lacked standing, the issue of its constitutionality was left undecided.
The case at issue, Clapper v. Amnesty International, is relevant to the ability of journalists to protect their sources and attorneys to protect the confidentiality of their privileged communications with their clients. The Plaintiff journalists involved in that case argued that if their communications with their sources were overheard, those sources’ identities, political activities and other sensitive information would be disclosed, which could potentially expose them to violence and retaliation by their own governments, non-state actors, and our own government. The attorneys involved argued that they risked disclosing litigation strategies and violating the attorney/client privilege if their communications with co-counsel, clients, experts and investigators were monitored. The journalists involved included Chris Hedges, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, and former reporter for the New York Times, who maintains regular contacts with academics, journalists, politicians and activists in such places as Iran, Syria and Palestine and the attorneys included attorneys for Guantanamo detainees, who in representing those defendants, need to communicate with their family members around the world.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which allowed the government to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, including surveillance of communications between persons located within the U.S. and surveillance of communications between persons located within the U.S. and persons located outside the U.S. The 2008 amendment did not change the law with regard to the former situation, which required that a federal officer has to submit an application, approved by the Attorney General, that describes the individual intended to be monitored, a basis for believing that that target was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, that the target was using or was about to use the facility at which the surveillance was directed, e.g., cell phone, telephone line, computer, e-mail, computer network, ISP, etc., procedures for minimizing the intrusion to privacy, the nature of the information sought, they types of communications intended to be monitored and a certification that a significant purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information and that the information could not reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques as well as the period of monitoring involved. A Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge had to approve that application agreeing that there was probable cause to believe both that the target was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the facilities or places monitored were being used or were about to be used by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that measures were taken to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning non-consenting U.S. citizens or require that that information which is nonpublicly available and which is not foreign intelligence not be disseminated in a manner that identifies a U.S citizen without that person’s consent, unless necessary to interpret the foreign intelligence information, unless that information is evidence in connection with a past, current or future crime.
The 2008 amendment changed the law as follows. Particular targets or facilities to be monitored now did not have to be identified. Now the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence could apply for a mass surveillance authorization by merely attesting generally to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court that a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information and that information will be obtained from or with the assistance of an electronic communication service provider, i.e., an internet, telephone or wireless provider. While the government still has to attest that the procedures are designed to ensure that the authorized monitoring is limited to targeting personas reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S., designed to prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication where the sender and all intended recipients are located in the U.S. and must not intentionally target a U.S. citizen reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S., the Court must accept that certification by the government if it meets the statutory requirements and must issue an order authorizing the government to conduct the surveillance and the monitoring may go on for up to one year. No probable cause determination is required or permitted. If the Court rejects the government’s application, the government can appeal the denial and during the pendency of the appeal, continue to conduct the requested monitoring, and, in exigent circumstances, the government may start wiretapping before applying for court authorization as long as it applies for authorization within 7 days and the FISA court cannot monitor the government compliance with that court’s authorization on an ongoing basis nor can it alter or revoke its previous surveillance authorization.
The Plaintiffs in the lower court in Clapper alleged that under the amended statute the government’s acquisition order could seek, for example, all telephone and e-mail communications to and from a country of foreign policy interest, e.g., Russia or Venezuela, including communications made to and from U.S. citizens and residents without a showing of probable cause; the government failed to contest that allegation. They believed that, because of the nature of their communications with their sources and contacts, that those communications would likely be “acquired, retained, analyzed and disseminated” under the surveillance scheme described above. As a result they “ceased engaging in certain conversations on the telephone and by e-mail,” which they asserted compromised their ability to cultivate sources, gather information and communicate confidential information to their clients and forced them to take such costly and burdensome measures as traveling to meet those sources and clients. The attorney Plaintiffs argued that they were obliged to take those measures so as to not to breach their ethical obligation to maintain the confidentiality of communications about client matters. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Clapper wrote on March 21, 2011 that, “On these facts, it is reasonably likely that the plaintiffs’ communications will be monitored under [the above-described scheme]” and that “Conferring standing on these plaintiffs is not tantamount to conferring standing on “any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices…are unconstitutional” and granted them standing. In 2008 the government sought 2,082 surveillance orders and the FISA court approved 2,081 of them. The Second Circuit wrote that the avoidance by the Plaintiffs of e-mail or telephone communications were “not overreactions….[but were] appropriate measures that a reasonably prudent person who plausibly anticipates that his conversations are likely to be monitored, and who finds it important to avoid such monitoring, would take to avoid being overheard.”
The concept behind “24” was that every season of that show involved an imminent threat. What constitutes a threat sufficient to justify the federal government intercepting our telecommunications is today as legally ill-defined a concept as it was in that show’s scripts; accepted by the viewer in the latter case and left to be accepted by us as citizens in the former.